U.S. decision making and post-cold war NATO enlargement by Conklin, Mark E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-03
U.S. decision making and post-cold war
NATO enlargement
Conklin, Mark E.







Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
U.S. DECISION MAKING AND POST-COLD WAR NATO 
ENLARGEMENT 
by 
Mark E. Conklin 
March 2015 
Thesis Advisor:  David Yost 
Second Reader: David L. Anderson 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
March 2015
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
U.S. DECISION MAKING AND POST-COLD WAR NATO ENLARGEMENT 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  Mark E. Conklin
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis investigates the major influences on U.S. decision-making regarding the enlargement of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) following the end of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many 
questioned the need for the Alliance’s continued existence. It was not obvious that NATO would survive, and indeed 
thrive in the twenty-first century. The United States has been the driving force behind NATO’s surprising endurance 
and growth. This thesis identifies key factors that have motivated American decision-makers to support the expansion 
of the Alliance’s membership since the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991. Time and again, evolving threats to 
transatlantic security have revealed the need to sustain the Alliance. Cold War fears of communist aggression were 
replaced by the dangers of instability created by ethnic and religious conflicts, as demonstrated in the Balkans. These 
dangers in turn gave way to menacing transnational terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. As the threats 
changed, the importance of close political association at times trumped that of enhanced military capability. 
Cultivating the international community of free democracies by expanding NATO membership provided a framework 
to counter the emerging threats. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); NATO enlargement; NATO-Russia relations; U.S.-




















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
U.S. DECISION MAKING AND POST-COLD WAR NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Mark E. Conklin 
Captain, United States Army 
B.A., Rutgers University, 2005 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(STRATEGIC STUDIES) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2015 
Author: Mark E. Conklin 
Approved by: Dr. David Yost 
Thesis Advisor 
Dr. David L. Anderson  
Second Reader 
Dr. Mohammed Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv




This thesis investigates the major influences on U.S. decision-making regarding the 
enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following the end of the 
Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many questioned the need for the 
Alliance’s continued existence. It was not obvious that NATO would survive, and indeed 
thrive in the twenty-first century. The United States has been the driving force behind 
NATO’s surprising endurance and growth. This thesis identifies key factors that have 
motivated American decision-makers to support the expansion of the Alliance’s 
membership since the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991. Time and again, evolving 
threats to transatlantic security have revealed the need to sustain the Alliance. Cold War 
fears of communist aggression were replaced by the dangers of instability created by 
ethnic and religious conflicts, as demonstrated in the Balkans. These dangers in turn gave 
way to menacing transnational terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. As the threats 
changed, the importance of close political association at times trumped that of enhanced 
military capability. Cultivating the international community of free democracies by 
expanding NATO membership provided a framework to counter the emerging threats. 
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This thesis investigates the major influences on U.S. decision-making regarding 
the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following the end of 
the Cold War. NATO was formed in 1949 as a political-military bloc with the primary 
purpose of countering the threat of communist expansion posed by the numerically 
superior military forces of the Soviet Union.1 America’s commitment to European 
security, demonstrated by the forward deployment of U.S. troops and equipment on 
European soil, was essential to NATO’s defense of Western Europe, both from the east 
and from within. By 1990, Germany was reunified and completely integrated with the 
West, and in 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, eliminating NATO’s principal adversary 
and the impetus behind the Alliance’s creation. In this context, America’s role in 
European security, and indeed NATO’s very existence, was called into question.2 Yet, by 
the end of the decade, the Alliance not only persevered, it grew! NATO welcomed three 
former members of the Warsaw Pact into its ranks in 1999. Five years later, seven more 
states were admitted, including three former Soviet republics. Five years after that, two 
additional states joined, raising the number of NATO Allies from sixteen at the end of the 
Cold War to the twenty-eight nations currently represented in Brussels. The enlargement 
of the Atlantic Alliance was largely an American-led initiative, which raises the question, 
why did American decision-makers support NATO enlargement? 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis topic is important because it gives insight into the American foreign 
policy decision-making process and sheds light on the factors that influenced U.S. 
decisions on NATO enlargement. This might enable one to identify the issues that will 
prove important in future enlargement debates. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
affirms the Allies’ commitment to hold the possibility of membership open to any 
                                                 
1 For a current and informative account of NATO’s origins see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 1948: The 
Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (Lanham, Maryland:  Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007). 
2 For an examination of NATO’s transition and transformation, see David Yost, NATO’s Balancing 
Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 1–30. 
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European state that is able to further Allied principles and contribute to Alliance 
security.3 Many European states wanted in after the fall of the Soviet Union, and still 
others are on a waiting list.4 In light of the elevated threat posed by a more assertive and 
aggressive Russian Federation with its eyes looking west, the NATO aspirations of 
Georgia and Ukraine have become the topics of publicized debate.5 Less well known are 
the NATO membership prospects for several smaller Eastern European hopefuls. 
Macedonia and Montenegro are currently participating in NATO’s Membership Action 
Plan (MAP). The Allies have endorsed Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in the 
MAP, pending the resolution of an immovable property issue.6 Serbia, a NATO 
adversary during the 1998–1999 Kosovo Conflict, seeks attainment of NATO standards, 
and its prospects for membership have been discussed.7 It is apparent that the Alliance 
will once again confront the subject of enlargement, and this thesis endeavors to identify 
the salient issues that will probably influence decision-making in the United States. 
B. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The United States is not a monolithic decision-making entity. The president and 
his cabinet have the preeminent role in foreign policy decision-making, but many 
individuals and organizations are involved in the process, and they are influenced by their 
interactions with one another and by external events. Additionally, enlarging NATO 
entails modifying the North Atlantic Treaty, which, by constitutional mandate, requires 
approval of ratification by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. Thus, this thesis considers 
                                                 
3 Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any 
other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by 
depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The 
Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such 
instrument of accession.”; The North Atlantic Treaty, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4, 1949, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. 
4 “NATO Enlargement,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Last updated June 12, 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm. 
5 For an example, see John J. Mearsheimer, “Getting Ukraine Wrong,” The New York Times, March 
13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/opinion/getting-ukraine-wrong.html. 
6 “NATO’s Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Last 
updated June 17, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49127.htm. 
7 “NATO’s Relations with Serbia,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Last updated February 11, 
2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50100.htm. 
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the factors that influenced the judgment of not only the president and his chosen 
secretaries, but also the United States Congress, particularly the Senate. 
Several things can affect a country’s foreign policy decisions. Perhaps first and 
foremost are major international events. This thesis considers, for example, the influence 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic violence in the Balkans, and the terrorist 
attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 had on American decision-
makers. Additionally, a decision’s effect on the international order and friendly relations 
with other nations is often an issue. In this case, the reaction of the Russian Federation, 
which saw NATO encroaching on its former sphere of influence, and the resultant effects 
on the hopeful states that were not extended membership invitations were important. 
Allied interests were also relevant, since modifying the North Atlantic Treaty required 
the unanimous consent of all members. Domestic concerns can influence foreign policy 
decisions as well, and this thesis discusses the roles that domestic elections, partisan 
politics, and bureaucratic differences within the U.S. administration played in NATO’s 
enlargement. Likewise, public opinion and attempts to express and influence it through 
election campaigns, media outlets, and lobbying efforts are explored. Finally, 
policymakers’ individual preferences and personal relationships among leaders factor 
into foreign policy decisions, and these are analyzed as well. 
This thesis draws upon a wide array of resources to support its conclusions. The 
published works of experts in the academic community provide theoretical and historical 
analysis of the decision-making process. The personal accounts of participants in the 
actual deliberations give insight into the principal issues under consideration. Public 
speeches and statements, news conference transcripts, reports, and interviews of key 
officials help to reveal how various presidents and their cabinets came to support NATO 
enlargement. Testimony at hearings, committee meetings, and reports throw light on the 
major issues considered by the Congress. Together, these sources provide a good account 
of how the United States formulated its decisions to support enlarging the Alliance. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Much has been written and said about NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement, 
notably regarding its motivations, its purposes, and its effects. This thesis does not 
attempt to investigate claims regarding promises allegedly made to Soviet officials in 
1990 that NATO would not expand eastward,8 neither does it comment on arguments that 
NATO’s enlargement provoked recent Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.9 This thesis 
does not consider the merits of enlargement in general, or speculate about the impact of 
enlargement on NATO’s internal decision-making processes. These matters have all been 
thoroughly addressed elsewhere.  
This thesis explores how the United States of America came to be such an ardent 
supporter of a policy that expanded the scope of its international obligations—something 
many leaders dating back to President Washington have cautioned against.10 Several 
hypotheses are considered. Official statements reflect each administration’s desire to 
integrate the international community of liberal democracies to create a Europe whole 
and free. Such lofty statements are important expressions of U.S. aspirations, but other 
considerations also inform assessments of the national interests of the United States. Is it 
possible that the United States have sought to preserve and even enhance its influence 
across the Atlantic, based on its position as the undisputed leader of NATO? What about 
the possibility of Russia’s resurgence? Though weakened, Russia’s public hostility 
toward the West persisted, as did Moscow’s desire to perpetuate and strengthen its 
influence over its adjacent territories. Is it plausible that the United States wanted to 
consolidate its gains made by winning the Cold War and incorporate the peripheral 
successor states of the Soviet Union into NATO to accrue a security advantage? This 
implies that the U.S. government pursued a deliberate and purposeful strategy in this 
                                                 
8 For more on this argument see Mark Kramer, “The Myth of a No NATO Enlargement Pledge to 
Russia,” The Washington Quarterly  32, no. 2 (April 2009): 39–61. 
9 For more on this argument see John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: 
The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs  93, no. 5 (September/October 2014), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-
fault. 
10 George Washington, “Farewell Address,” The American Presidency Project, September 19, 1796, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65539. 
 5
regard, when in fact there was a series of ad hoc decisions. Furthermore, in light of 
America’s protracted and often unpopular military campaigns in various regions, one 
might contend that the United States attempted to use NATO’s enlargement in order to 
recruit more supporters for its expeditionary military operations in order to enhance the 
legitimacy of these operations. Along similar lines, perhaps American policymakers 
believed that by inviting new European democracies to join NATO, Europe would be 
better able to provide for its own defense, thus alleviating America’s military 
commitments to the region. Emotional factors also contributed to U.S. support for 
NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement. For example, U.S. decision-makers sought to atone 
for abandoning Central and Eastern Europe to German and Soviet domination.11 
Scholars, pundits, and bloggers have drawn attention to such consideration, as well as 
many others. This thesis attempts to elucidate the essential motives behind America’s 
support for enlarging the Alliance. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The most extensive body of literature regarding NATO’s post-Cold War 
enlargement concerns the Allied decision to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland in 1997. Ronald D. Asmus, in his book Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance 
Remade Itself for a New Era, provides an insider’s account of the Clinton 
Administration’s efforts to extend the Alliance’s membership to the new democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe. According to Asmus, American leadership was crucial to 
surmounting three problems associated with NATO enlargement: framing the 
enlargement decision so as not to incite an anti-Western backlash that might undermine 
Russian reformers, devising a scheme of enlargement that satisfied the concerns of the 
Allies as well as those of prospective members, and incorporating enlargement as a vital 
component of the revitalization and repurposing of the Alliance. By Asmus’ account, 
NATO enlargement was a way to promote peace and stability in Europe, reach out to and 
encourage reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and reestablish NATO’s preeminent 
role in European security. Asmus recounted the efforts of the Clinton Administration to 
                                                 
11 Madeleine Albright quoted in David Yost, NATO Transformed (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 128. 
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promote democracy and spread peace and security in Europe eastward while modernizing 
NATO to meet the threats of a new epoch. The war in Bosnia and the failed coup attempt 
in the waning Soviet Union in August 1991 reminded the Central and Eastern European 
democracies of their vulnerability. While the decision to enlarge NATO was spurred by 
the desires of the prospective members, the Clinton Administration embraced the cause 
and managed the process with the goal of expanding the scope of the Euro-Atlantic 
partnership.12 
In “The Transformation of NATO and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Svein Melby 
describes how transforming NATO through enlargement, “both of membership and 
mission,” serves permanent U.S. foreign policy goals in Europe.13 With regard to Russia, 
a measured enlargement and repurposing both enhance the Alliance’s capability to 
address the threat of a resurgent and expansionist Russia and simultaneously serve 
Russia’s interests by redefining the organization’s purpose from that of adversarial 
opposition to one of cooperative engagement. Melby suggests that enlarging the Alliance 
will also help to resolve regional disputes involving members through the peaceful means 
of conflict resolution promoted by the organization, eliminating the possible need for 
intervention by outside powers and unnecessary escalation. NATO has the unique 
capability of combining military and political instruments to provide security guarantees 
to support new democratic regimes. Melby draws a parallel between post-Cold War 
NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe and the post-World War II Marshall 
Plan in Western Europe.14 Additionally, NATO transformation could increase the United 
States’ ability to address concerns out of the Euro-Atlantic region while handing much of 
the responsibility for European security back to NATO’s European members. By Melby’s 
account, NATO enlargement serves the enduring U.S. foreign policy goals of preventing 
the rise of a dominant oppositional force in Europe and promoting regional stability. 
However, an overly ambitious policy could provoke tensions; therefore, special 
                                                 
12 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
13 Svein Melby, “The Transformation of NATO and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in A History of NATO: The 
First Fifty Years, 1, ed. Gustav Schmidt (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 236. 
14 Ibid., 241. 
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consideration must be taken to develop a conservative, predictable approach to 
enlargement and transformation.15 
Lawrence Kaplan’s paper, “NATO Enlargement: An Overview,” draws out the 
enduring themes that governed NATO enlargement throughout the organization’s history 
up through the addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999. The first 
such theme is the contribution to collective defense that each new member represented at 
the time of its accession. Underlying this theme is the recognition by European Allies of 
their dependence on American military support for regional security. The decision to 
increase NATO’s initial population from the Brussels Treaty countries (Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and the United States to include 
Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal was made, in part, based on the 
strategic link these nations provided between Europe and the United States. 
The second theme present in each round of NATO enlargement is the desire to 
establish a unified democratic Europe in order, as Kaplan puts it, “to end once and for all 
the fratricidal wars which had wracked the continent since the rise of the nation-state.”16 
The 1952 addition of Greece and Turkey represents, among other things, an attempt to 
surmount the historical animosity that existed between these two countries. The 
conditions of West Germany’s admission to the alliance promised to allay fears of future 
German aggression and fully integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into Western 
institutions. Kaplan’s account suggests that even during the Cold War, each decision to 
enlarge the Alliance dealt with considerations of strategic benefits for collective defense 
as well as political implications for the trans-Atlantic community. For Kaplan, 
enlargement decisions were influenced by European desires to preserve the U.S. 
commitment to transatlantic security, the United States’ interest in sustaining its 
transatlantic influence, and a genuine determination by all to bring peace and stability to 
the European continent.17 
                                                 
15 Melby, “Transformation of NATO,” 235–250. 
16 Lawrence Kaplan, “NATO Enlargement: An Overview,” in A History of NATO: The First Fifty 
Years, 1, ed. Gustav Schmidt (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 193. 
17 Ibid., 193–208. 
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Frank Schimmelfennig gave a constructivist explanation for NATO enlargement. 
He argued that “NATO is a specialized organization—the military branch—of the Euro-
Atlantic or Western community of liberal-democratic and multilateralist values and 
norms,” and that these values and norms guide the decisions of community members.18 
Schimmelfennig contended that NATO membership was offered as a reward for the 
adoption of Western values and norms, and that the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland were chosen because they had made the greatest progress toward adopting them. 
He offered the U.S.-crafted Partnership for Peace as evidence of the process of 
international socialization, whereby the Central and Eastern European states were 
introduced to Western values through cooperation and were encouraged to adopt these 
values through a system of measured progress. In Schimmelfennig’s view, the relative 
power of the United States and the reward of NATO membership being made contingent 
upon internalizing Western values greatly facilitated the socialization process. 
Schimmelfennig argued that NATO enlargement was pursued due to a desire to spread 
western values eastward and a moral obligation to extend membership to states that 
assimilated Western ideals. He contended that rationalist theories, such as realism, cannot 
account for these desires and this sense of obligation.19  
Kenneth Waltz presented multiple explanations for NATO’s post-Cold War 
enlargement through a realist lens of international relations. He contended, “Realists, 
noticing that as an alliance NATO has lost its major function, see it simply as a means of 
maintaining and lengthening America’s grip on the foreign and military policies of 
European states.”20 Waltz stated that the end of the Cold War confronted the world with a 
condition of unipolarity, in which the United States was free to promote its agenda 
unchecked. For Waltz, it was unsurprising that the United States, being a liberal 
democracy, sought to promote its values abroad, ignoring potentially adverse 
implications for its own security in the absence of a major threat. Waltz wrote that the 
                                                 
18 Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Approach,” Security Studies  8, no. 
2–3 (1998): 198. 
19 Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Approach,” 198–234. 
20 Kenneth N. Waltz, “NATO Expansion: A Realist’s View,” Contemporary Security Policy  21, no. 2 
(2000): 29, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260008404253. 
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Administration of George H. W. Bush went to great lengths to see that the efforts of 
European states to establish an independent security identity after the Cold War were 
done under the auspices of NATO and not outside of it, thus attempting to preserve and 
extend U.S. influence in Europe. Waltz held further that NATO’s expansion was largely 
an effect of American domestic politics, namely President Clinton’s efforts to win over 
key Midwestern states with heavy Central and Eastern European influences, as well as 
states with arms industries that stood to benefit from the new high-demand markets in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Waltz challenged liberal institutionalist theory, arguing that 
international institutions such as NATO serve only to further the purposes of their 
dominant members. In Waltz’ words, “NATO survives and expands now not because of 
its institutions but mainly because the United States wants it to.”21 22 
John Lewis Gaddis described U.S. support for NATO enlargement as the product 
of America’s second post-Cold War governing administration—that of William J. 
Clinton—having an excessively narrow world view, in light of its upbringing in the Cold 
War. According to Gaddis, the decision to champion NATO as the organization through 
which to seek European integration sprang from overconfidence in the Alliance after its 
Cold War success. Gaddis also wrote that the Clinton Administration was particularly 
moved by the plight suffered by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and that 
NATO enlargement was pursued out of an emotionally based obligation to do right by the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.23 
E. MAIN ARGUMENT 
This thesis recognizes that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. 
leaders acknowledged that threats to peace and security still existed in the Euro-Atlantic 
region, and NATO remained an apt institution for addressing these threats. Also, the 
nature of the threats elevated the importance of political reform above that of military 
capability, and NATO membership represented an incentive for implementing and 
                                                 
21 Waltz, “NATO Expansion,” 35. 
22 Ibid., 23–38. 
23 John Lewis Gaddis, “History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement,” Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy  40, no. 1 (1998): 145–51, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/survival/40.1.145. 
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maintaining such reforms. International events were among the major influences on U.S. 
decision-making regarding NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement, and that these events 
that underpinned arguments in support of NATO enlargement and provided the 
opportunity and motivation to promote American and Western ideals in an effort to 
enhance stability in Europe and improve security at home. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union increased NATO’s freedom to act in Central and Eastern Europe, but it was the 
threat to European security posed by instability in the Balkans that restored NATO’s 
purpose and convinced many Allied political leaders of the merits of enlarging the 
Alliance. Absent ethnic conflict and persistent nationalism in Europe’s Balkan region, the 
United States and its Allies would have found little justification to expand their 
association with Central and Eastern Europe through military cooperation. The United 
States seized this opportunity to reaffirm its leadership on the European continent and 
expand the international community of free democracies through NATO. The terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated America’s vulnerability and elevated the 
importance of seeking like-minded partners to combat the growing ideological threat to 
the Western world. Consolidating European democracy and promoting interoperability 
and information-sharing became paramount objectives. In response to the terrorist 
challenge, the United States supported an ambitious enlargement agenda, including 
former Soviet republics. The protracted and unpopular war in Iraq divided the members 
of the United Nations and the Alliance. By promoting further enlargement, the United 
States was able to refocus the Alliance toward cooperative efforts and recruit more 
material and political support for its expeditionary military efforts. Supporters of U.S.-led 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan received unequivocal support from the United States 
for their aspirations for Western integration.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The introductory chapter to this thesis has framed the study’s overall argument, 
stated the major research question, and discussed the importance of the research topic. 
The introduction then discussed the research methods used, presented the various 
hypotheses that were explored, and examined several arguments that have previously 
been put forth. The second, third, and fourth chapters all provide analysis of the United 
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States decision-making process as it relates to NATO’s enlargement. Chapter II focuses 
on NATO’s first post-Cold War enlargement round, when the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland were admitted in 1999. Chapter III discusses NATO’s second enlargement 
round, which welcomed Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia into the Alliance in 2004. Chapter IV covers NATO’s most recent round of 
enlargement, whereby Albania and Croatia became Allies in 2009. Finally, Chapter V 
restates the overall argument of the thesis and summarizes the arguments made in the 
preceding chapters. It then discusses the prospects for American support for future 
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II. NATO ENLARGEMENT 1999 
The demise of communism, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and, finally, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union generated the initial impulses to enlarge NATO. It was not 
obvious that the disappearance of NATO’s chief opponent would lead to enlarging the 
Alliance; indeed, some questioned the necessity of NATO’s very existence. The ensuing 
debate would span the better part of a decade, culminating in the addition of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland in March 1999. According to David Yost, “The U.S. 
debate may be ultimately the most significant, because the credibility of Alliance 
commitments hinges, in the final analysis, on the United States above all.”24 This chapter 
investigates the factors that influenced American decision-making, finding that, 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the uncertainty about Russia’s political future 
and its relationship with the West greatly influenced American decisions on enlarging 
NATO. Unstable domestic politics in Russia divided American policymakers on the 
enlargement issue, and Russia’s opposition to NATO’s growth affected the pace and 
scope of enlargement decisions. Numerous factors competed to shape America’s stance 
on increasing NATO’s membership, but deference to the goal of supporting Russia’s 
democratic reform and establishing a cooperative strategic relationship with the West’s 
principal former adversary guided America’s NATO enlargement policies. 
A. UNREST IN EUROPE 
As the fall of the Soviet Union progressed and the communist empire released its 
grip on its former satellites in Central and Eastern Europe, democratic institutions were 
established in the former Warsaw Pact countries and the newly independent former 
Soviet republics. These political developments boded well for overcoming the political 
antagonism that divided Europe throughout most of the twentieth century. The 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (CSCE) 1990 Charter of Paris, with 
over thirty signatories including Russia and the United States, charged states to “fully 
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respect each other’s freedom of choice” in regard to security relationships.25 As Central 
and Eastern European governments began to escape the control of the Soviet Empire, 
they sought closer integration with the West, and NATO was among the first 
organizations to reach out to them through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC). The United States sought to promote the spread of democracy in these 
countries, and NATO provided an apt vehicle at a time when the Alliance’s purpose and 
future were uncertain. 
Democratic reformers in Central and Eastern Europe fought hard to make 
expanding the Alliance an item on the United States and NATO agendas. These leaders 
wanted strongly to integrate with Western institutions, and the Alliance became the target 
of choice for their lobbying efforts. The lengthy process entailed by the European Union 
(EU) was discouraging, as was the perceived inability of the CSCE/OSCE to provide real 
security guarantees.26 The unsuccessful coup attempt in Russia in August 1991 and the 
seizure of the Russian White House in October 1993 highlighted Russian reformers’ 
tenuous grasp on power and warned of the possibility of Russia reasserting its regional 
influence if hardliners returned to power. The leaders of states aspiring to NATO 
membership, most notably Czech President Vaclav Havel and Polish President Lech 
Walesa, personally implored President Clinton at the dedication of the Holocaust 
Museum in Washington, DC, to enlist his support for their accession into NATO. 
President Clinton maintained that these individual appeals greatly influenced his own 
view on NATO enlargement.27 Stanley Sloan, the founding director of the Atlantic 
Community Initiative, wrote, “From the Holocaust meetings on, President Clinton had an 
emotional as well as philosophical predisposition toward enlarging NATO.”28 
                                                 
25 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would later become the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); Charter of Paris for a New Europe, The 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, http://www.osce.org/mc/39516?download=true. 
26 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door:  How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New 
York:  Columbia University Press, 2002), 11–12. 
27 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 25. 
28 Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain 
Challenged (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 150. 
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Instability in the Balkans supported arguments in favor of enlarging NATO. The 
war in Bosnia demonstrated that nationalism continued to threaten security and stability 
in Europe. NATO’s failure to effectively address the conflict early on fueled skepticism 
about the Alliance’s future and undermined its credibility as a European security 
institution. Many NATO advocates believed that the organization and its mission needed 
to be updated to remain relevant in the new strategic environment. Settling the dispute in 
Bosnia was one of President Clinton’s primary foreign policy concerns, and NATO’s 
inability to arrive at a consensus to act decisively helped to convince the President that 
the Alliance needed to adapt. The conflict’s geographic location within Russia’s 
traditional sphere of influence also caused tension between America’s desire to stop the 
fighting and aspirations to solidify a partnership with Russia.29 
The war in Bosnia helped to first distract public attention away from NATO 
enlargement and then reinforce its base of support. When the U.S. president was reluctant 
to make substantive progress toward enlargement, escalation of the war in Bosnia 
provided a suitable diversion. The capture of several hundred UN personnel, the mass 
slaughter in Srebrenica, and the accidental deaths of U.S. diplomats inspired the United 
States and NATO to step up their efforts to intervene. The Alliance ultimately achieved a 
cease-fire agreement and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords; the effect was to 
revive NATO’s image as a guarantor of European security and reinforce NATO 
aspirations in Central and Eastern Europe. Support for the merits of enlargement also 
grew among the Allies. The Alliance’s efforts in Bosnia boded well for the establishment 
of a NATO-Russia partnership, as Russian forces were integrated into the follow-on 
NATO-led peacekeeping operations. 
B. POLITICS AND PREFERENCES 
Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance was not a stated priority of the Clinton 
Administration early on, but it presented itself as an opportunity that conformed to the 
president’s ideological interests. President Clinton ascended to the nation’s highest office 
on a campaign platform focused largely on domestic revitalization, rather than ambitious 
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foreign policy. During the campaign, however, presidential candidate Clinton did 
demonstrate a desire to expand and lead the international community of free democracies. 
He accused President Bush of failing “to offer a compelling rationale for America's 
continued engagement in the world,” adding that, “the Administration has invited a new 
birth of isolationism on the left and the right,” thus suggesting the future president’s 
internationalist preferences.30 Clinton also expressed his belief that the United States 
could lead “a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance 
that defeated Communism,” hinting that he saw a future for NATO and envisioned a 
leadership role for the United States within the Alliance.31 Enlarging NATO to Central 
and Eastern Europe offered the chance to remain engaged in world affairs, champion the 
spread of democracy, and assume a leadership role in modernizing the Alliance. This was 
not immediately recognized by the Clinton Administration upon assuming office, but 
came later as a result of international events. 
In addition to conforming to the president’s ideological preferences, NATO 
enlargement was a politically attractive initiative. Gaining support from Central and 
Eastern European ethnic minorities across the Midwest facilitated President Clinton’s 
victory in the 1992 election. These ethnic groups traditionally supported Republican 
candidates, but were alienated by President Bush’s hesitation in recognizing the newly 
independent former Soviet republics.32 Supporting NATO enlargement was a way for the 
Democratic Party to preserve the votes of Americans of Central and Eastern European 
heritage in future congressional and presidential elections. Though Clinton 
Administration officials maintain that domestic politics did not influence the decision-
making process, James Goldgeier asserts that, “Political considerations are an inevitable 
part of crafting a major foreign policy initiative, particularly one that requires support 
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from two-thirds of the Senate.”33 This sentiment was confirmed by Ron Asmus’ 
interview with Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser in 1993–1997. Lake 
commented, “The politics of NATO enlargement were like sex in the Victorian age: no 
one talked about it, but everyone thought about it.”34 
The Republican Party strongly endorsed increasing NATO’s membership, but 
remained highly critical of the Administration’s efforts to do so. Republican opposition 
argued that the Clinton Administration was more concerned with Russian sensitivities 
than with American and European interests. They believed that the Clinton 
Administration’s steps toward enlargement were timid and inadequate.35 Republican 
politicians repeatedly proposed legislation to force real progress toward enlargement, 
including setting a timetable, naming prospective candidates, and specifying criteria for 
new member selection. They did not share the Clinton Administration’s concern for 
Russian domestic politics and establishing a NATO-Russia partnership. Promoting 
NATO enlargement was one of the tenets of the Republican Party’s Contract with 
America campaign that won majorities in both Houses of Congress in 1994, threatening 
to steal the issue away from the Administration and further threaten negotiations with 
Russia. Republican pressure reinforced the Clinton Administration’s support for 
enlargement, and, in part, motivated the president to endorse enlargement explicitly. 
Shortly after the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), President Clinton called upon 
the Alliance to formally examine the enlargement issue, which surprised the Allies and 
sparked outrage from Moscow, foreshadowing the difficulties the United States would 
have in reconciling its competing foreign policy goals.36 
C. BUILDING CONSENSUS 
Key figures within the Clinton Administration itself did not initially agree with 
the president’s position supporting NATO enlargement. Many outright opposed enlarging 
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the Alliance, fearing that it would empower political opposition in Moscow and threaten 
the more important goal of establishing a partnership with a new democratic Russia. Even 
some of those who agreed with enlargement in principle opposed it in practice on the 
grounds that it would damage U.S. relations with Russia and undermine reform efforts. 
The Department of Defense under Secretary Les Aspin argued that a unified Europe 
could be better achieved through military cooperation with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, and especially Russia, under a new security framework. Secretary 
William Perry continued the Defense Department’s opposition to enlargement, 
contending that further military cooperation was needed to overcome the persistent 
adversarial relationship between Russia and the West. Some in the State Department 
feared that enlargement would increase America’s and NATO’s obligations without 
adding any capabilities to facilitate meeting those new security requirements. The U.S. 
military, likewise, worried about extending commitments to Europe in light of shrinking 
forces and budgets coupled with competing strategic priorities elsewhere around the 
globe.37 
The lack of consensus backing NATO’s enlargement at the genesis of the debate 
restrained the United States from embracing it outright. Instead, the United States 
recommended the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, which was a measure to increase 
cooperation between NATO and the former Soviet sphere beyond the efforts of the 
NACC. Indeed, PfP was and is open not only to “former adversaries” but to all non-
NATO countries participating in the CSCE/OSCE. It was a compromise measure that 
was widely accepted among the Clinton Administration and the Allies because it was 
open to all CSCE/OSCE nations, including Russia, but extended no additional security 
guarantees. Even Russian President Boris Yeltsin was highly supportive of the PfP, 
though interpreting it as an alternative to NATO’s expansion. Thus, the PfP furthered 
U.S. foreign policy goals by strengthening NATO’s ties with the new democracies in 
Central and Eastern Europe while leaving the door open for future Russian cooperation.38 
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Domestic politics in Russia were perhaps the most powerful influence on 
decision-makers throughout the NATO enlargement debate. Supporting Russia’s 
democratic reformers and establishing a favorable relationship between NATO and 
Russia were the top foreign policy priorities of President Clinton, most of his 
Administration, and many of the NATO Allies. Great emphasis was placed on building a 
strategic partnership with Russia and supporting Russian democracy. Though President 
Yeltsin’s erratic declarations suggested questionable reliability to some, the Russian 
President’s personal commitment to democratic reform made him an ally of the Clinton 
Administration. Enlargement decisions were made in consideration of their effects on 
President Yeltsin’s government. The attempted coups in 1991 and 1993 threatened the 
reform regime and the future of Russia’s rapprochement with the West. Russian 
parliamentary and presidential elections during the 1990s saw candidates attempt to 
outdo each other with anti-NATO and anti-Western rhetoric, which complicated efforts to 
negotiate a NATO-Russia partnership. Russian politicians put forth the now famous 
argument that the West was violating promises made to Soviet officials during 
negotiations for Germany’s reunification that NATO would not expand its territory 
eastward. In their analysis of Russian anti-Western sentiment for the Heritage Foundation 
in 2010, Ariel Cohen and Helle Dale noted, “Russian public sentiment was largely pro-
American as Communism collapsed, yet shame, blame, and nostalgia soon set in.” They 
assert, furthermore, “From the Kremlin's perspective, anti-Americanism is a strategic tool 
for pursuing domestic and foreign policy goals. It has remained this way for almost the 
past 100 years.”39 
Though President Yeltsin was reelected in 1996, parliamentary elections saw 
nationalists and communists successively increase their power, and Russian politics 
coalesced around opposition to NATO’s enlargement; even moderate officials 
vehemently opposed it. The adversarial relationship between Russia and NATO had not 
yet disappeared. Progress toward enlarging the Alliance continuously threatened 
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cooperation with Moscow; the two American policy initiatives were inexorably 
connected. David Yost summarized the challenge posed to American policymakers by its 
dual foreign policy goals, capturing the Russian point of view: “If NATO wants to build a 
relationship of partnership and cooperation with Russia, why are NATO governments 
extending collective defense commitments to nations that have expressed distrust and 
antagonism toward Russia?”40 Strong Russian opposition motivated a conservative 
approach toward enlarging NATO throughout the Alliance for fear of upsetting the 
political balance. 
Democratic reformers in Central and Eastern Europe persistently pressured the 
West to make progress toward enlarging NATO. They viewed the PfP as an insufficient 
step. They relentlessly engaged the American president, his Administration, Congress, 
and the American public. The fear of Russian expansionism remained in the former 
Soviet sphere. Inconsistent declarations by the Russian Administration and increasingly 
hostile rhetoric directed against the West exacerbated concerns. During talks with 
American officials, Polish President Lech Walesa conveyed his desire to “cage the bear” 
and worried that the West was squandering an historic opportunity; Czech President 
Vaclav Havel instead appealed to the perhaps nobler intentions of expanding democracy 
and reshaping the political identities of the Central and Eastern European region.41 While 
the economic, military, and political reform efforts of these hopeful nations may have 
been lacking at times, their desire and determination to join the Alliance remained 
resolute. Their eager pursuit of NATO membership helped motivate the United States to 
move forward, but also worked against American efforts to control the pace of 
enlargement so as to make it as acceptable as possible to Russia. 
Rounding out the debate were those that continued to oppose NATO’s 
enlargement. Many objections came from the Democratic Party, most notably Senator 
Sam Nunn. Senator Nunn questioned the feasibility of extending a credible security 
guarantee to Eastern Europe while simultaneously convincing Russians that enlarging 
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NATO was not directed against them.42 Senator Nunn was most concerned with nuclear 
issues, particularly curtailing their spread and controlling nuclear stockpiles in the former 
Soviet republics. He worried that enlargement would make Russia less cooperative on 
nuclear issues. The Democratic Senator’s objections, coupled with his clout within the 
party, threatened to undermine the chances for consensus within the Clinton 
Administration. Other arguments echoed the concerns among the Allies about diluting the 
Alliance, alienating and/or undermining Russian reformers, and extending commitments 
to countries that (critics maintained) represented instability and little national interest. 
While the Republican criticism reinforced the Clinton Administration’s resolve, the 
political opponents of enlargement threatened to weaken it. 
Advocates of enlarging NATO, among the minority originally, held influential 
positions within the Clinton Administration that provided them with leverage to guide 
policy. First and foremost, the president’s support for enlargement was crucial to 
reaching agreement on the issue within the Administration. Operating with the 
knowledge that President Clinton backed NATO’s enlargement, National Security 
Adviser Anthony Lake, also an enlargement proponent, steered the National Security 
Council toward policies that favored expanding the Alliance. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher came to support enlargement after reviewing the arguments made by 
enlargement supporters among his staff and the academic community. Richard 
Holbrooke’s appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
Affairs, with his support for enlargement, political experience, and reputation, helped rein 
in the rest of the Clinton Administration.43 
The personal relationship between President Clinton and President Yeltsin also 
influenced the pace of enlargement. President Clinton believed that President Yeltsin was 
truly committed to democratic reform in Russia and attributed Yeltsin’s public 
conflagrations to Russian domestic politics. Likewise, President Yeltsin trusted that 
President Clinton was a true supporter of his government and acknowledged Clinton’s 
genuine interest in improving the security environment for all of Europe. President 
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Clinton corresponded and met with President Yeltsin regularly during the enlargement 
debate to help smooth out issues and reinforce his support for Yeltsin’s government. The 
two presidents worked out an arrangement, known as the May for May deal, whereby 
each would do what he could to facilitate the other’s reelection in 1996. President Clinton 
agreed to restrain efforts to expedite the enlargement process beyond the initiation of the 
enlargement study to ease some of the political pressure on Yeltsin. The Russian 
president, for his part, agreed to sign up for NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, 
begin negotiations for a formal NATO-Russia partnership, and forego making statements 
to the effect that Russia was impeding NATO’s enlargement.44 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott tempered the Administration’s pursuit of 
enlarging the Atlantic Alliance. His personal relationship with President Clinton and his 
Russian expertise helped guide the dual-track approach toward NATO enlargement in 
conjunction with Russian rapprochement. The Secretary of State’s Chief of Staff, Tom 
Donilon, purportedly said of the Talbott-Clinton relationship, “There’s only one person 
[Talbott] in this building the President calls Sunday night to see how he’s doing.”45 
Talbott’s extensive experience as a Russia expert shaped his views on enlargement and 
the NATO-Russia partnership. Though originally viewed as an enlargement opponent, 
Deputy Secretary Talbott was instrumental in guiding parallel negotiations facilitating the 
achievement of both policy goals. Talbott lobbied to ensure that enlargement progress did 
not outpace or interfere with efforts to strengthen the relationship with Russia. 
D. ALLIED ATTITUDES ON ENLARGEMENT 
Early discussions of the topic revealed serious reservations among the most 
influential NATO Allies. France preferred to integrate the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe slowly through European institutions, rather than through NATO, an 
organization led by the United States. This view was widely shared within the Alliance. 
The British feared that increasing membership would dilute the security guarantee and 
weaken America’s commitment to the defense of Europe. The Brits questioned the will of 
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their own public to guarantee the security of new members in Central and Eastern 
Europe. While Volker Rühe, the German Defense Minister in 1992–1998, expressed his 
personal support for enlargement publicly, the German government was not willing to 
support enlargement during initial deliberations. The lack of consensus supporting 
enlargement in the early stages of the debate argued against the United States 
recommending any concrete steps toward enlargement.46 
The position of America’s Allies began to change once the United States 
demonstrated its firm commitment to enlarging NATO. The president’s call for NATO’s 
enlargement came as a surprise to many Allies that had assumed that the Partnership for 
Peace had forestalled a formal discussion on enlargement.47 Several Allies shared the 
reservation that NATO enlargement should not proceed at the expense of NATO’s 
relations with Russia. If the goal of enlargement was to stabilize Europe, reigniting Cold 
War tensions between Russia and the West and undermining Russian democratic 
reformers would not serve that goal. 
When Russia stepped up its opposition to NATO enlargement, support for 
enlarging the Alliance from some of the most influential European Allies began to waver. 
The British remained committed and warned of the consequences of backing down in the 
face of Russian antagonism. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however, proposed a 
moratorium on enlargement discussions, recommending a period of two years. The 
French preferred to have an official NATO-Russia partnership negotiated prior to 
pursuing enlargement. Allied objections added to the arguments supporting a slow and 
gradual approach to expanding NATO’s membership, in order to seek a cooperative 
relationship with Russia either beforehand or in tandem.48 
E. THE NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT 
Combined pressure from within the Administration and among the Allies made 
the successful negotiation of a NATO-Russia partnership of paramount importance for 
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NATO’s enlargement. Failing to reach terms with Russia threatened to further enflame 
Russian opposition and undermine Allied support for U.S. goals. In correspondence with 
President Clinton regarding enlargement, President Yeltsin wrote, “I trust that our 
justified concern will, as you said, not simply be noted, but will be taken into account in a 
clear and precise form. It would be best if this were done, as you yourself stated publicly, 
in the form of an official agreement between Russia and NATO.”49 Reaching an 
agreement would go a long way to calming Russian and therefore Allied anxieties. In his 
1997 address to Congress on the State of the Union, President Clinton declared, “We 
must expand NATO by 1999, so that countries that were once our adversaries can 
become our Allies. At the special NATO summit this summer, that is what we will begin 
to do.”50 Professing his intent to proceed with enlargement at the Madrid summit left 
only a few months to resolve the differences between NATO and Russia and reach a 
formal agreement. America’s displayed commitment to expanding the Alliance shifted 
Russian efforts away from preventing enlargement and toward controlling it. 
The agreed language in the NATO-Russia Founding Act greatly acknowledged 
Russian concerns. Russia sought guarantees that NATO forces and infrastructure would 
not be stationed on the territory of any new members.51 This demand had precedent, as 
NATO had agreed to similar terms during negotiations on Germany’s reunification and 
incorporation into NATO, but it conflicted with Allied desires to extend credible security 
guarantees and full-fledged association to new members.52 NATO’s enlargement study 
laid the ground work for reaching agreement on these military dimensions. The Alliance 
concluded that it possessed the ability to defend Central and Eastern Europe without 
adjusting its nuclear posture or permanently deploying forces eastward onto the territory 
of prospective new members.53 The enlargement study reflected these conclusions, but 
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highlighted the necessity to preserve the right to reconsider such decisions as conditions 
warrant.54 The text of the final agreement yielded to Russian concerns by including 
assurances that NATO members had, “no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy 
nuclear weapons on the territory of new members” and, “the Alliance will carry out its 
collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, 
integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent 
stationing of substantial combat forces.”55 The document spoke to Allied preferences by 
preceding those assertions with conditional language such as, “in the current and 
foreseeable security environment . . .,” which afforded the Allies with the option to 
reconsider those decisions in the future.56 
In addition to addressing security concerns, the Founding Act established the 
Permanent Joint Council institutionalizing the NATO-Russia partnership. As part of the 
negotiations, Russia demanded a role in NATO’s decision-making process. NATO, for its 
part, wanted to increase cooperation with Russia while preserving Alliance integrity. The 
Permanent Joint Council embodied the agreed upon framework, which would serve as the 
”principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia” and “provide a mechanism 
for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, 
for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern.”57 
Russia therefore achieved for itself a venue through which it could attempt to influence 
NATO’s executive processes, but fell short of its goal of infiltrating NATO’s internal 
deliberations. The Allies were able to include that, “Provisions of this Act do not provide 
NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do 
they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-
making and action.” With a formalized partnership in place, the Alliance could forge 
ahead on its plans to increase its membership. 
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F. EXTENDING INVITATIONS 
The NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed on May 27, 1997, six weeks before 
the NATO summit in Madrid where the Alliance extended invitations to the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland. During negotiations for the Founding Act, among other 
demands, the Russians sought to limit the scope of enlargement to as few nations as 
possible, particularly restricting former Soviet republics like the Baltic States. Russian 
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov stated, “If any countries of the former Soviet Union 
are admitted to NATO, we will have no relations with NATO whatsoever.”58 Chief 
among American and Allied concerns, however, was leaving the door open for future 
expansion of the Alliance without specifically excluding any European nations. Part of 
what motivated American support for limiting new member invitations to three was the 
desire to avoid the issue of the Baltic States. Extending invitations to former Soviet 
republics would have immediately undermined cooperative efforts between NATO and 
Russia; so, from America’s point of view, states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were 
not yet suitable for consideration. These states, however, were arguably just as far along 
on the path to reform as were some of the leading candidates for membership, namely 
Romania, which was championed by France.59 If the United States advocated 
membership for Romania and Slovenia, it might give the impression that Russian 
objections carried weight, discouraging the future pursuit of membership and 
emboldening Russian opposition. The United States wanted to keep demand high among 
potential new members to preserve the goal of creating a unified Europe without 
recreating any divisive lines. Inviting a small group of the most highly qualified 
candidates achieved this goal. It preserved hope among states that were continuing their 
reform efforts and avoided foreclosing opportunities to any particular country. It settled 
on the three contenders with the widest support, and avoided choosing between other 
Allied favorites or dealing with the Baltic issue. Formal meetings held by cabinet 
secretaries and their deputies arrived at the same conclusions, and President Clinton 
agreed with their recommendations. 
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G. TREATY RATIFICATION 
By the U.S. Constitution, America’s final endorsement of new NATO members 
required the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. A special NATO Observers Group was 
created to involve the Senate in the enlargement process early. Throughout the debate, 
the principle of NATO enlargement received bipartisan support, but its final 
implementation was open to subversion, whether by Senators who opposed enlargement 
outright or by those who disagreed with specific terms or candidates. 
Organized efforts were instrumental in achieving the necessary ratification to 
expand NATO’s membership. An active campaign, led by Administration official Jeremy 
Rosner, helped secure support for enlargement among any major group that might arise to 
oppose it; the media, local governments, veterans associations, and the like were all 
brought on board. Concerns about costs were eased by RAND analysts, who compared 
expanded membership’s annual per capita cost to that of a candy bar, and by equally low 
cost projections from multiple government agencies.60 Parallel efforts of business 
interests and ethnic lobbies all rallied to build overwhelming support for enlargement. 
NATO enlargement did face opposition arguments. Republican Senator Jesse 
Helms led a vocal challenge to the Administration’s enlargement policy by attacking the 
NATO-Russia partnership. Senator Helms argued that NATO was a military alliance 
aimed at preventing the emergence of a European hegemon, particularly Russia.61 Newly 
appointed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright addressed the Senator’s concerns, 
explaining that the NATO-Russia Founding Act preserved the integrity of NATO’s 
decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and that issues of doctrine and 
strategy would not be subject to Russia’s approval.62 As Goldgeier also points out, many 
highly regarded former government officials, such as George Kennan, Charles Kupchan, 
Michael Mandelbaum, Paul Nitze, Sam Nunn, and Brent Scowcroft all voiced their 
opposition, but they were not part of an organized effort to stop NATO’s enlargement.63 
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The little structured resistance that materialized was unable to overcome broad American 
support for enlargement. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Whether attempting to formulate a consensus, determining the appropriate 
timetable, or selecting prospective candidates for new membership, America’s decisions 
on enlarging the Atlantic Alliance competed with its goal of building a partnership with a 
new democratic Russia. Many factors interacted to influence American decision-makers, 
but it was the expected effects of enlargement decisions on the prospects for cooperation 
with Russia that guided America’s stance on NATO’s enlargement. The prospects for 
strategic cooperation with Russia were perhaps better in the 1990s than they are today in 
2014, and the full effects of America’s enlargement decisions may not yet have been felt. 
Objections that enlargement amounted to “kicking this former giant” went largely 
unheeded.64 Russia’s recent return to the expansionist policies of its past have 
reinvigorated the enlargement debate, prompting many to question whether NATO’s 
enlargement contributed to the current crises as the Russians say it did. While mounting 
tensions between Russia and the West threaten future cooperation, America’s decision to 
promote enlarging the Alliance may come to be viewed in a different light. At the time 
these decisions were made, however, enlarging the Alliance was consistent with 
American interests and goals, particularly of promoting the spread of democracy and the 
unification of the European continent. 
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III. NATO ENLARGEMENT 2004 
America’s support for NATO’s second, much larger round of post-Cold War 
enlargement proceeded on the momentum of the previous decision to take in new 
members and was greatly facilitated by changing Alliance dynamics and enhanced 
cooperation with Russia in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States 
on September 11, 2001. Allied declarations and new programs instituted at the NATO 
Summit in Washington, DC, in 1999 set in motion the process for the next round of 
enlargement. The debate was largely a matter of which countries would be invited, rather 
than whether or when the Alliance would take on new members. Applicants seized an 
opportunity to prove their worth to the United States and its Allies as Russia relaxed its 
opposition to NATO’s expansion. 
A. PRESSURE TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN 
As in the first round of NATO enlargement, the American administration was 
subjected to unrelenting pressure from Central and Eastern European democratic leaders 
and their domestic constituents. By early 1997, twelve partners had expressed an interest 
in joining the Alliance, and more were forthcoming. Three of those twelve—the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland—attained membership in 1999, and the Alliance sought 
to encourage further progress among the remaining aspirants by reiterating its 
commitment to NATO’s open door policy. 65 In return, hopeful states not only repeated 
their previously stated desires to join the Alliance, they also united in their efforts to 
attain NATO membership, forming a coalition that became known as the Vilnius 9, 
comprised of Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia.66 (This group became the Vilnius 10, after the addition of Croatia 
in 2001.) In May 2000, the group hosted a conference in Lithuania’s capital on NATO’s 
role in European security and issued a joint statement expressing their collective 
aspiration to accede to NATO membership as a group and called upon the Alliance to 
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extend them invitations at the next NATO Summit, which was scheduled for 2002.67 
Aspiring to NATO membership as a group appealed to those supporters of NATO 
enlargement that sought to avoid periodically upsetting relations with Russia by 
incrementally adding new members. Subsequent appeals came regularly, both from the 
individual governments of applicant states and their domestic supporters in America, as 
well as from the group forum.68 In most cases, contenders for membership made 
significant progress on their respective Membership Action Plans (MAP), and this 
strengthened their bids for membership. 
Shortly after the March 1999 accessions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland, the Washington Summit in April 1999 marked the launch of the MAP. Like the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) before it, the MAP was aimed at keeping the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe engaged with the West while reinforcing their 
dedication to democratic reform. Although instituting the MAP was a measure short of 
extending additional invitations to prospective members, it reinforced the Allies’ 
commitment to NATO’s open door policy under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
by expounding upon the guidelines for membership set forth in the Alliance’s 1995 
Enlargement Study. The MAP provided the Alliance with some time to analyze the 
effects of admitting new members before inviting more and gave prospective future 
members more specific guidance to improve their chances for attaining NATO 
membership. By setting forth clear goals for prospective members to attain, the Alliance 
arguably limited, to a degree, its freedom to make subsequent enlargement decisions. 
The MAP measures a country’s performance in five key areas: political and 
economic issues, defense and military issues, resource issues, security issues, and legal 
issues. Through coordination with the aspirant state, NATO members identify specific 
concerns within each area and work with their partners to find and develop ways to 
achieve reform. Through cooperation, annual programs for reform are produced for 
implementation by the partner state. Annual progress reports by the Alliance provide 
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feedback and guidance for further progress. While the Allies have maintained that 
“participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future 
membership,” successful completion of a country’s respective MAP serves as an 
important step in the process of preparing for accession.69 Conversely, some have argued 
that the MAP radically changed the guidelines for NATO membership after the first 
round, making reform efforts and subsequent admission of new members more 
demanding.70 
The MAP introduced a new dimension to enlargement decision-making within the 
Alliance. NATO members maintained that enlargement would not take place 
automatically on the basis of completing a checklist of tasks. Thus the MAP provided no 
guarantee of future membership.71 The MAP did, however, make the process of 
measuring a state’s reform progress more objective; judging one state’s performance 
against that of the others arguably became easier. Consequently, it would have been 
difficult to deny membership to one state that had successfully made the recommended 
reforms according to the guidelines set forth by the Alliance, while extending 
membership to another, which had made less progress, without undermining NATO’s 
open door policy. As James Goldgeier pointed out in an examination of NATO’s second 
round of enlargement, “The Membership Action Plan and, more importantly, the 
announcement that NATO would review the progress of the nine formal aspirants for 
membership at its 2002 summit . . . locked NATO into a process by which turning new 
members away in 2002 would cast severe doubts on the Alliance's credibility.”72 
Ultimately, new member accession is a political decision made by consensus agreement 
among Alliance members, and factors in addition to political and military reform play 
                                                 
69 Press Release NAC-S(99) 066, “Membership Action Plan,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
issued on April 24, 1999, http://www.nato.int/cps/de/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
70 Margarita Assanova, “A Debate on NATO’s Evolution,” Report of the CSIS Eastern Europe 
Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies (March 20003), 22,  
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/NATO_Debate_guidebook.pdf. 
71 Jeffrey Simon, “NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Prospects for the Next Round of 
Enlargement,” East European Studies Essay no. 58, The Woodrow Wilson Center, November 2000, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACF45B.pdf. 
72 James Goldgeier, “Not When but Who,” Examining Enlargement, NATO Review, 2002, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/Examining-Enlargment/Not-when-but-who/EN/index.htm. 
 32
important roles, such as geostrategic location. But a failure to invite new member states 
that had made significant progress in accordance with the MAP would have called into 
question the Alliance’s willingness to integrate those states, thus threatening their future 
dedication to democratic reform. 
The inertia created by the Clinton Administration’s support for NATO 
enlargement would have been difficult for the president elected in 2000 to overcome. The 
1999 NATO Summit in Washington DC saw the Allies reaffirm their commitment to the 
Alliance’s open door policy, announce the institution of the Membership Action Plan 
providing enhanced guidance for countries wishing to join, and pledge to reexamine 
NATO enlargement at the next summit meeting, to be held no later than 2002.73 These 
actions likely raised the expectations of prospective new members—or at least 
maintained them—and ensured that the enlargement issue would be an item on the 
incoming president’s foreign policy agenda. 
B. DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR ENLARGEMENT 
In a report generated by the RAND Corporation in 2000 analyzing dozens of 
papers written by leaders in American politics aimed at supporting President-Elect 
George W. Bush in his assumption of the nation’s highest office, the authors affirmed 
that American leadership would guide the enlargement debate within the Alliance and 
urged the incoming president to declare America’s support for admitting new members, 
arguing that it should be among his top priorities for immediate action.74 The report also 
warned that failing to back NATO enlargement would signal a significant policy change, 
which would diminish the credibility of both the Alliance and the United States in 
Europe.75 Furthermore, the authors declared that upholding the perceptions that NATO’s 
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door remained open and that neither Russia nor any other non-Ally had a vote in Alliance 
decision-making was of paramount importance.76  
As the U.S. Senate would ultimately be called upon to ratify Alliance 
enlargement, the Senators were important decision-makers. Senator Richard Lugar, an 
influential legislator representing Indiana, Nobel Peace Prize nominee, and staunch 
enlargement supporter, sponsored a resolution declaring congressional support for 
America’s endorsement of continued Alliance enlargement at the Washington Summit in 
1999 and continued to be a strong and vocal advocate thereafter.77 In June 2001, Senator 
Lugar called on America and the Alliance as a whole to “seize this unprecedented 
opportunity to expand the zone of peace and security to all of Europe.”78 Likewise, 
President Bush’s principal opponent for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000, 
Arizona Senator John McCain, actively supported NATO enlargement, even advocating 
membership for the controversial Baltic states.79 Other influential commentators, 
including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Patrick Buchanan, and Henry Kissinger, also expressed 
their support for enlargement.80 
Like his predecessor President Clinton, President George W. Bush strongly 
supported expanding the Atlantic Alliance. Just a few months into his presidency, 
President Bush publicly declared his support for NATO enlargement while touring 
Europe. At a meeting of NATO leaders in Brussels, Belgium, President Bush declared, 
“We must extend our hands and open our hearts to new members to build security for all 
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of Europe.”81 Two days later, in a news conference with Polish President Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, President Bush stated unequivocally, “My government believes NATO 
should expand.”82 That same day, President Bush indicated support for a sizable 
enlargement, announcing to a group of students at Warsaw University, “As we plan the 
Prague summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with but how much 
we can do to advance the cause of freedom. The expansion of NATO has fulfilled 
NATO's promise, and that promise now leads eastward and southward, northward and 
onward.”83 The American president expressed his support for NATO enlargement during 
meetings with several European leaders, including Russian Federation President Vladimir 
Putin.84 Of note, the Russian president expressed his concerns over the growth of the 
Western military alliance, but persuaded listeners to focus on the cooperative efforts 
between NATO and Russia rather than the dispute.85 
Opponents of NATO’s second round of enlargement revisited earlier arguments in 
a new context. The main arguments put forth against the first round of NATO 
enlargement were that the costs of admitting new members would be excessively high 
and the benefits would be small, that adding new members would complicate consensus-
based Alliance decision-making, and that the threat to NATO-Russia relations 
outweighed the importance of consolidating European democracy. These arguments were 
overcome by 1997 because it came to be believed that the prospective members being 
considered at that time were economically competent enough to contribute to the 
Alliance, that the enlargement would be small enough to be manageable, and that 
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sustained improvement in NATO-Russia relations was a demonstrated priority of both 
the American and Russian governments. 
The performance of NATO’s new members—along with many of their Western 
European counterparts—in attaining appropriate levels of defense spending proved to be 
lacking, however, which made the cost argument more salient. Also, the second round 
debate considered the inclusion of as many as nine new members, which threatened to 
have an exponentially greater complicating effect on Alliance decision-making. 
Additionally, none of the states being considered for membership possessed sufficiently 
competent and sizable military capabilities (in contrast with Poland, for example), which 
led many politicians to oppose enlargement on the grounds that the second round of 
enlargement would increase NATO’s responsibilities without enhancing its capabilities. 
Some went as far as to argue that the states under consideration, particularly the Baltic 
states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were too difficult to defend or were perhaps even 
indefensible. Furthermore, Russia’s adamant opposition to the accession of the Baltic 
states into NATO was well known.86 
C. ALLIED ATTITUDES ON SUBSEQUENT ENLARGEMENT 
American enthusiasm for further NATO enlargement was not widely shared 
among NATO members. According to The Economist, “Europe is divided, though most 
countries would probably prefer no new members, since it is proving expensive enough 
to assimilate Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.”87 Particularly divisive was the 
issue of whether or not to extend invitations to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, since, as former Soviet republics, their admission was likely to provoke an 
adverse reaction from Russia. The British government had previously voiced its concern 
about the dilution of the Alliance by adding only a few new members; the “big bang” 
approach being advocated by many exacerbated those reservations.88 In October 2000, 
NATO’s Secretary General Lord George Robertson hinted at the Alliance’s 
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dissatisfaction with the progress of the applicants: “The alliance will enlarge again when 
NATO is ready, when those nations aspiring to membership are ready, and when their 
membership will contribute to security and stability in Europe as a whole.”89 Despite 
these assertions, the Alliance continued to declare its intent to uphold its open door 
policy. 
D. DEBATING POTENTIAL CANDIDATES 
The questions of whether America would support NATO’s second post-Cold War 
round of enlargement and when that enlargement might occur were largely answered by 
President Bush’s remarks in Warsaw and the scheduling of the NATO Summit in Prague 
for November 2002. The question of which candidacies America would support remained 
a matter for speculation. For many applicants, an equally strong case could be built both 
for and against their accession. The United States had failed to back the applications of 
Romania and Slovenia during deliberations for NATO’s previous round of enlargement 
despite their being championed by influential European Allies. Slovakia was also 
considered in early discussions for the first round of enlargement, but disqualified itself 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, largely due to his government’s 
tenuous support of liberal democracy.90 
Several years later, many of the same factors that had denied these states 
American support continued to persist. Slovenia was perhaps the least controversial 
candidate, having never been a member of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. 
Moreover, Slovenia, along with Slovakia, provided a land bridge to Hungary; but 
Slovenia was a small country with minimal resources and capabilities, and its progress 
remained slow.91 Slovakia had made great strides toward reform, but the possibility of 
the reelection of Mečiar meant that continued progress was not guaranteed. Additionally, 
public support for NATO membership in Slovakia had diminished greatly as a result of 
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NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo crisis.92 Romania and Bulgaria represented the 
greatest potential additions in military capability and territory, but their reform progress 
lagged well behind the rest.93 Domestic unrest in Macedonia hampered its application. 
While public support for NATO accession in Albania soared, this country also had a long 
way to go toward making the necessary reforms.94 
The most contentious issue in the debate over NATO’s second post-Cold War 
enlargement round was the admission of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. These applicants were former Soviet republics, and Russian officials 
repeatedly expressed adamant opposition to the prospect of their accession to NATO. As 
mentioned in an earlier chapter, Russian President Boris Yeltsin attempted to secure a 
guarantee from President Clinton, prior to NATO’s first post-Cold War enlargement, that 
the Baltic states would not be considered for Alliance membership. Subsequent 
statements in the Russian media as well as from Russian leaders in the foreign ministry, 
the military, and elsewhere in the government continuously conveyed vehement hostility 
toward the notion of Baltic NATO membership, threatening retaliatory measures ranging 
from the severing of cooperative relations to aggressive military action. 
The integration of the Baltic states was particularly contentious for Russia 
because it put Western Alliance members between itself and its isolated enclave in 
Kaliningrad, thus limiting Russia’s ability to support its Baltic Sea Fleet elements located 
at Baltiysk. This unfortunate geographic reality presented a potential for crisis. To 
illustrate, the Baltic states could deny transit to Russian troops seeking only to resupply 
or reinforce installations in Kaliningrad. In turn, Russia might ignore the objections of the 
Baltic States and send troops onto the sovereign territory of Lithuania if Moscow deemed 
it necessary.95 The potential for such a situation to escalate would be great, arguing 
against Baltic accession to NATO for fear that a local dispute could grow to encompass 
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the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Additionally, Russia had only recently completed the 
withdrawal of its troops and military infrastructure from the territory of the Baltic states 
in 1999, and each of them continued to be home to large Russian populations, on whose 
behalf Russia often claimed mistreatment.96 
Another aspect of the dispute over possible Baltic membership was that, as James 
Goldgeier put it, “these countries have limited resources, populations and capabilities.”97 
Incorporating the Baltic states would, at best, only marginally improve the collective 
defense capability of the Alliance. The largest of the Baltic states, Lithuania, had a total 
population of only 3.6 million people. Wilson Center Scholar Jeffrey Simon cited the 
Baltic states’ small size as the principal factor limiting their accession to the Alliance.98 
Their proximity to Saint Petersburg and Moscow made them particularly vulnerable to 
Russian aggression, leading enlargement detractors to question the Allies’ capability to 
guarantee Baltic security. Even by enlargement supporter Ron Asmus’ account, “as small 
states in a volatile region, the Baltic States . . . cannot fully guarantee their own 
security.”99 This made them both ardent pursuers of NATO membership and also 
Alliance liabilities. 
Though arguably lacking in significant strategic benefits for the Alliance, the 
Baltic states were among the leading candidates for NATO membership on the basis of 
their reform progress. In order to compensate for their diminutive stature, these states 
established joint military institutions, such as the Baltic Defense College, joint military 
capabilities, like the Joint Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), and joint military 
organizations (for example, the Baltic Battalion, or BALTBAT) to augment their 
potential to contribute to NATO missions and European security. They reminded 
Alliance members that size and military contributions did not prevent Luxembourg or 
Iceland from joining NATO. They also made large strides in instituting democratic 
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reforms, and they settled most of their outstanding territorial and minority disputes, 
though Russia complicated some of their efforts in its attempt to thwart their accession to 
NATO.100 
The Baltic states cited improved relations between Russia and Poland as proof 
that their admission to NATO would benefit all. They developed close relations with the 
United States, codified by the State Department’s Baltic Action Plan in 1996 and 
followed by the Baltic Charter of Partnership in 1998. Moreover, several former U.S. 
officials openly declared their support for Baltic NATO membership, including former 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former President Bill Clinton.101 In this 
context, a subsequent denial of membership for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would 
have threatened to undermine NATO’s Article 10 commitment to remain open to any 
European nation that sought to further Alliance principles and contribute to European 
security and would have also suggested that Russian opposition had an influence on 
Allied decision-making. 
Despite the progress made by the Baltic states and the implications of rejecting 
their requests to join, Baltic advancements did not guarantee American or Allied support 
for their accession to NATO. As late as March 2001, testifying before the House 
International Relations Committee, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed some 
skepticism and concern regarding their admission to the Alliance. Anthony Blinken, an 
analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., ventured 
that Allied support for Baltic accession was weak, adding that “Moscow will try to draw 
a red line around the Baltic states . . . and the European Allies will probably go along.”102 
The accession of the Baltic states posed a challenging problem for officials seeking both 
to expand the Alliance and improve Allied relations with Russia. 
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E. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AND ITS EFFECTS ON ENLARGEMENT 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the enlargement debate.  As 
one author noted, “Without this catalytic . . . event, the debate right up to Prague would 
have remained the same as early 2001.”103 At the NATO Summit in Washington in 1999, 
the Allies agreed to launch the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), calling upon NATO 
members to improve the mobility, deployability, and sustainability of their armed forces 
to enable the Alliance to defend its collective interests abroad as well as its territory at 
home.104 The DCI entailed significant investment in new technologies and cooperative 
capabilities. Some argued that the DCI increased the economic burden on prospective 
members, and this caused speculation about their chances to attain sufficient 
interoperability to support their applications for admission. The September 11 attacks 
rapidly changed the perceived threat situation, challenging the importance of the DCI. 
Shortly after the attacks, each of the NATO applicants offered the United States its 
support in various forms, ranging from official statements to transit rights and military 
capabilities.  In an article for National Defense Magazine, Elizabeth Book concluded, “In 
the new security environment, the aspirants’ willingness to side with the United States in 
the war on terrorism, to contribute niche emergency-response capabilities and to share 
information for counterterrorism, have set the countries apart as allies of the United 
States.”105 Their willingness to help when needed and as able proved more salient than 
the expenditure of scant resources on more robust military capabilities. This had an effect 
on American decision-makers, as the president subsequently became more forthright in 
his support for a larger round of invitations at the Prague Summit.106 As the September 
11 attacks and the ensuing campaign against terrorism changed dynamics within the 
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Alliance, the United States sought more Allies upon whom it could call for access, 
information, and support. 
An enhanced collaborative relationship between NATO and Russia emerged as a 
result of cooperation on counterterror efforts, which reduced much of the impediment to 
the United States and the Alliance in pursuing a bigger second round of post-Cold War 
enlargement. According to James Goldgeier, the Bush Administration felt that NATO’s 
enlargement was less of a hindrance to cooperation with Russia than other issues, such as 
ballistic missile defenses and intervention in Kosovo; and when U.S.-Russian relation 
improved in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks, Russian opposition became 
even less of a concern.107 
Leading up to NATO’s first round of post-Cold War enlargement, the Alliance 
and Russia achieved an extraordinary level of cooperation, with Russia joining the 
Partnership for Peace and contributing forces to the Alliance’s operations in Bosnia. This 
cooperation culminated in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which formalized the new 
relationship. Relations quickly began to sour when the Alliance stepped up its Balkan 
interventions, conducting an air campaign in response to the Kosovo crisis, and when 
America withdrew from the ABM Treaty and revisited the idea of developing ballistic 
missile defenses.108 Russia found common ground upon which to cooperate with the 
Alliance after 9/11, as opposing Islamic extremists in its Northern Caucasus had long 
been a priority of the Russian government. 
The effect that Russia’s cooperation would have on NATO’s enlargement was at 
first uncertain. Many feared that Russia would leverage its improved relations with the 
West against the Allies’ intention to expand, with particular regard to the Baltic states.109 
Others stressed the importance of formalizing an enhanced collaborative relationship 
between NATO and Russia, building upon the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed prior 
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to the previous enlargement round, and even holding open the possibility of Russia’s 
future accession to the Alliance to prevent Russian isolation. President Putin expressed 
compatible sentiments during an interview in November 2001 with National Public 
Radio’s Robert Siegel: “Russia acknowledges the role of NATO in the world of today. 
Russia is prepared to expand its cooperation with this organization. And if we change the 
quality of the relationship, if we change the format of the relationship between Russia 
and NATO, then I think NATO enlargement will cease to be an issue.”110 Richard 
Holbrooke, a key player in NATO’s previous enlargement round, summed up the effects 
of 9/11 as follows: “The tragedy increased the urgency of enlarging NATO . . . and 
reduced Russian resistance to such a move.”111 
Just as the Alliance took steps to improve relations with Russia in conjunction 
with NATO’s previous enlargement, the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council 
(NRC) was announced in Rome in May 2002. Replacing the Permanent Joint Council 
(PJC) created by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NRC instituted a more equal 
partnership: “a mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint 
decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum 
of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.”112 With a new enriched relationship with 
the Russian Federation in place, the United States and the other Allies were freer to 
proceed with the addition of more member states, including the former Soviet republics 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. At the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, seven states 
were invited to accede to the Alliance: the three Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
F. CONCLUSION 
President George W. Bush shared his predecessor’s vision of creating a Europe 
whole and free through enlarging the Atlantic Alliance to include the democracies of 
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Central and Eastern Europe “from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between.”113 
This notion remained popular with a majority of Washington’s political elite. The issue 
took on a new life and America’s decisions were largely influenced by events in response 
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The applicants pled their case and proved 
their worth by supporting America’s expeditionary efforts following the shocking and 
tragic events. Likewise, Russia and NATO stepped up their cooperative efforts, forging a 
closer collaborative relationship institutionalized in the NATO-Russia Council. These 
developments paved the way for NATO’s second post-Cold War enlargement in 2004, 
adding Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and 
thereby increasing Alliance membership from nineteen to twenty-six. The “big bang” did 
not exhaust the list of applicants, however, and thus NATO’s door remained open. 
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IV. NATO ENLARGEMENT 2009 
At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO invited two Balkan states, 
Albania and Croatia, to join the Alliance. These states would become Allies a year later. 
At Bucharest, the Allies also pledged to extend an invitation to Macedonia114 pending the 
resolution of its name dispute with Greece (an issue that had not yet been resolved in 
2015) and “agreed today that these countries [Georgia and Ukraine] will become 
members of NATO” at some unspecified future date.115 The United States supported a 
more ambitious enlargement agenda, including an invitation for Macedonia and 
participation in NATO’s MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Analysis of NATO’s third round 
of post-Cold War enlargement reveals that America’s decision to support farther reaching 
action was based upon broad pre-existing bipartisan support for enlargement and the 
desire to take in new Allies that might contribute and provide legitimacy to NATO-led 
military operations abroad. The American debate over potential candidates, both those 
vying for NATO membership and those seeking increased association, stressed foremost 
the importance of the candidates’ contributions to ongoing military operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo, subordinating pertinent concerns about their progress in 
implementing reforms, their ability to fulfill Alliance collective defense obligations, and 
the potential effects on relations with Russia. 
A. INTERNATIONAL EVENTS 
The international environment confronted American decision-makers with several 
challenges pertinent to the issue of enlarging the Alliance. Unrest in the former 
Yugoslavia, which led to NATO’s intervention on behalf of Kosovo, had not yet been 
resolved. Western backing for the Kosovar government’s desire to establish its 
independence threatened to reignite tensions with Russia, who would not support a 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. Indeed, just two months prior to the 
NATO Summit in Bucharest, Kosovo declared its independence and many Western 
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countries quickly extended recognition, while Russia condemned the act as a violation of 
several international accords and agreements and called upon the international 
community to “respond responsibly to this challenge” and recognize the “dangerous 
consequences” that supporting separatism poses to the international order.116 The U.S.-
led intervention in Iraq, which Russia and many European Allies opposed and criticized, 
escalated, as President Bush surged the American troop presence to its highest level in 
2007. Additionally, violence soared in Afghanistan as the NATO-led campaign against 
the Taliban and al Qaeda wore on. With the U.S. military broadly engaged in overseas 
conflict, the contributions of Allies and partners became the subject of much scrutiny. 
Shortly after the Bucharest Summit, armed conflict would erupt over Georgia’s attempt 
to reintegrate the Russian dominated, separatist controlled regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, elevating concerns about NATO’s relationship with Georgia and Russia’s 
intentions in the post-Soviet space. It was in this context of conflict that NATO’s third 
round of post-Cold War enlargement would take place. 
B. PROSPECTIVE CANDIDATES 
NATO membership was a long standing goal for the Balkan states of Albania, 
Croatia, and Macedonia, having been original members of the Vilnius Group, which saw 
seven of its ten members accede to NATO in 2004. Leading up to the Bucharest Summit, 
however, a bevy of issues complicated the Balkan states’ quest for membership 
invitations. Albania was on a well-established path toward reform and Western 
integration. In a 2007 news conference with President Bush, Albanian Prime Minister 
Sali Berisha declared his government’s determination to “undertake any reform that 
would make Albania suitable to receive the invitation [to NATO].”117 Public support for 
NATO in Albania was extremely high, in relation to other candidates, and Albania 
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offered some strategic benefit given its geographic location bordering Kosovo.118 
Arguing against Albania’s candidacy was its status as “the poorest European state, 
plagued by political instability throughout the 1990s, with a reputation for widespread 
corruption.”119 Croatia did not establish a formal relationship with NATO until joining 
the PfP in 2000, but it was quick to win over the Allies in its campaign for NATO 
membership. Indeed, President George W. Bush declared his support for Croatia’s 
accession to NATO as early as 2006.120 Croatia’s largest obstacle was its lack of 
domestic support for NATO membership.121 Like Albania, Macedonia enjoyed 
widespread public support for NATO membership, but demonstrated a lack of reform 
progress, and its longstanding dispute with Greece over the use of the name Macedonia 
was an impediment to accession.122 Greece, a NATO member since 1952, objected to the 
use of the name for fear that it implied claims on Greek territory, despite Macedonia’s 
assertions to the contrary, and threatened to block Macedonia’s accession. 
To overcome their issues, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia worked very closely 
with the United States to support Western initiatives, reform their governments and 
militaries, garner public support for NATO membership, and promote regional security. 
They concluded the Adriatic Charter with the United States in 2003, affirming their 
dedication to reform and Euro-Atlantic integration. They participated in and hosted a 
variety of PfP exercises and contributed to U.S-led and/or NATO-led missions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo to varying degrees, which gained them great favor with 
the George W. Bush Administration. (Croatia abstained from participation in Iraq in the 
absence of what Zagreb regarded as satisfactory UN Security Council authorization.) 
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Despite the significant progress made by these three Balkan candidates, serious issues of 
corruption, organized crime, and accountability remained at the time of their accession. 
By many accounts, the U.S. government nonetheless went to extraordinary lengths to 
support their accessions, even securing remarkable extensions to their approved reform 
timetables to allow them to make more significant progress.123 
Georgia and Ukraine were (and remain) controversial and divisive candidates 
seeking closer ties to NATO and eventual membership in the Alliance. Both states saw 
pro-Western reformist governments ascend to power in the so-called color revolutions 
(the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine).  Both states had 
long-standing histories of cooperation with NATO beginning in the early 1990s. Both 
states sought invitations to participate in NATO’s MAP at the Bucharest Summit. 
Ukraine established a special relationship with NATO in 1997 through the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) that 
oversees cooperation and consultation. Furthermore, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was 
established in 2002. Comparable to the MAP, it measures Ukraine’s progress in the five 
key areas of political and economic issues, defense and military issues, resource issues, 
security issues, and legal issues and, like the MAP, is reviewed annually. At the time of 
the Bucharest Summit, Georgia had implemented many reforms outlined in its Individual 
Partnership Action Plan with NATO and established an Intensified Dialogue with the 
Alliance.124 Both Georgia and Ukraine made significant contributions to operations in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and especially Iraq (where Georgia was the third largest 
contributor of troops).125 
Despite the long-established partnerships, several arguments against closer 
cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine persisted within the Alliance. The lack of public 
support for NATO in Ukraine at that time was particularly damaging for this country’s 
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membership prospects. Low poll numbers and mass demonstrations against NATO were 
causes for concern.126 Ukraine’s large Russian-speaking population and the country’s 
dependence on Russian resources also argued against its candidacy. In Georgia, separatist 
movements warned of instability, and the government’s crackdown on demonstrators and 
media outlets raised doubts about the country’s progress toward democratization.127 
Georgia’s relations with neighboring Russia remained tense. A Congressional Research 
Service report cited Russia’s envoy to the NATO-Russia Council, Dmitriy Rogozin, as 
stating that Georgia’s accession to NATO would “destabilize the Caucasus region and 
further harm Russia-Georgia relations.”128 The report also quoted statements from 
Russian officials who argued in early 2008 that, “If NATO invites Georgia to participate 
in a MAP, then Russia should extend diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in order to base Russian troops in those regions.”129 The Russians acted on this 
threat later in 2008. Despite their shortcomings in military capabilities and democratic 
credentials, American support for both Georgia and Ukraine remained strong. During a 
visit to Georgia, in a news conference with President Mikheil Saakashvili, President Bush 
declared, “I believe that NATO would benefit with Georgia being a member of NATO, 
and I think Georgia would benefit. And there's a way forward through the MAP.”130 He 
made a similar declaration with regard to Ukraine during a visit to Kiev prior to the 
Bucharest Summit.131 
C. THE ALLIES’ OUTLOOK 
Though it appeared to be widely accepted that some progress would be made 
toward enlarging the Alliance, America’s European Allies were in disagreement over the 
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scope of the enlargement decision that would take place in Bucharest. The principal point 
of discord came over whether Georgia and Ukraine would be invited to participate in the 
MAP. Many of NATO’s newest members, including Poland, Romania, and the Baltic 
states, endorsed the American view supporting the extension of the MAP to both Georgia 
and Ukraine. Estonian President Toomas Hendrick Ilves cited the MAP’s influence on 
motivating aspirants to make progress: “[The MAP] forces nations to reform even when 
they don’t want to do it.”132 Others reminded the Allies that the MAP set countries on a 
long and difficult course and was no guarantee of membership; thus, taking action in 
support of Georgia and Ukraine should not be provocative to Russia. Latvian President 
Valdis Zatlers warned about the risks of delaying action and the possibility of alienating 
reformers in Georgia and Ukraine.133 
Other influential Allies opposed taking such a large step toward closer 
cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine. Germany, in particular, was unequivocal in its 
position against according MAP status to Georgia and Ukraine. German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel argued that Georgia’s unresolved border disputes, and the potential to 
provoke Russia excluded Tbilisi from consideration.134 Other German officials cautioned 
that, in the Georgian case specifically, the potential for confrontation with Russia was too 
great to justify a MAP invitation. Likewise, France opposed making progress toward 
NATO membership for both Georgia and Ukraine for fear of upsetting relations with 
Russia and the European balance of power. Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Spain also opposed MAP for Georgia and Ukraine.135 
The Allies also disagreed over the leading candidates up for accession. The 
aforementioned name-dispute with Greece disqualified Macedonia from NATO 
membership (pending a resolution to the dispute) since accession requires unanimous 
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consent. Some Allies remained skeptical that Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia had made 
sufficient reform progress and sought to slow the pace of NATO enlargement to deal with 
other issues.136 Some felt that American support for the membership of these three 
Balkan states was based more on their contributions to U.S-led or NATO-led operations 
than fulfillment of MAP guidelines. These differences of opinion added to ongoing 
disagreements over Alliance policy, including ballistic missile defenses and troop levels 
in Afghanistan.137 
D. RUSSIAN OPPOSITION 
Leading up to the Bucharest Summit, a wide range of issues burdened U.S.-
Russian and NATO-Russian relations. Allied operations in Kosovo, tensions over 
European land-based ballistic missile defenses, and vocal opposition and criticism of 
U.S.-led military operations in Iraq were among the major points of contention. Indeed, 
Russia threatened to reverse its position with regard to recognizing separatist movements 
in Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia in response to Kosovo’s independence.138 After the 
United States revealed its plans to station missile defense systems in the Czech Republic 
and Poland, Russian President Putin accused the West of starting “an inevitable arms 
race” and threatened to pull out of several treaties.139 President Putin delivered harsh 
anti-U.S. rhetoric in his speech at a conference on security policy in Munich in 2007, 
stating that “Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any 
problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of 
tension . . . plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. . . . The United 
States has overstepped its national borders in every way.”140 
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Regarding NATO, in his 2007 Munich speech, President Putin called the 
Alliance’s enlargement “a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”141 
He issued a threat to aim Russian nuclear missiles at Ukraine should this country ever 
accede to the Alliance and host NATO facilities.142 He later told President Bush in 
Bucharest that Ukraine would “cease to exist as a state” should it ever attain NATO 
membership.143 Additionally, Russia demonstrated its influence over Ukraine by 
exploiting its dependency on Russian energy resources. With respect to Georgia, Russia’s 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia would not allow Georgia to join 
NATO, while Sergei Markov, the director of the Moscow Institute of Political Studies, 
was quoted in 2006 as saying, “Georgia has not yet earned our respect for its 
sovereignty.”144 President Putin also threatened to recognize the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in response to Georgia’s bid for NATO membership.145 
Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy and ever more repressive domestic policy 
signaled a significant departure from the course set by the democratic reformers with 
whom the United States and NATO sought to establish a cooperative relationship 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. A 2006 report issued by a task force of the 
Council on Foreign Relations asserted that “Russia’s emergent authoritarian political 
system will make it harder for the two sides to find common ground and harder to 
cooperate even when they do,” though the report did stress the long-term importance of 
cooperation.146 
U.S.-Russia relations were not totally absent cooperation, however, as combined 
efforts to counter terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction continued. 
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Also, the United States supported Russia’s bid to join the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2006. In any event, Russian opposition did not seem to affect U.S. support for 
the NATO aspirations of any of the Eastern European hopefuls. Russia had not yet 
emerged as a major foreign policy concern for the Bush Administration. Russia’s 
purported red lines around the Baltic states did not prevent their accession to NATO in 
2004, and the United States sought to preserve the principle that Russia would not get a 
vote in NATO’s decision-making process. 
E. EXECUTIVE DECISION 
President George W. Bush’s unwavering support for enlarging NATO continued 
throughout his eight-year tenure in office. In his remarks at a 2004 ceremony honoring 
the Alliance’s recent addition of seven new European Allies, President Bush praised 
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia for their progress toward reform and participation in 
U.S.-led and NATO-led operations. He added, “The door to NATO will remain open 
until the whole of Europe is united in freedom and in peace.”147 Speaking at Latvia 
University in Riga in 2006, the president again reaffirmed his and the Alliance’s 
commitment to an open door policy, and expressed an intention to extend additional 
invitations at NATO’s next summit in 2008, mentioning Albania, Croatia, Georgia, 
Macedonia, and Ukraine specifically; he then went on to discuss at length the importance 
of U.S.-led operations in Iraq and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan.148 
When pressed by the Albanian media regarding their country’s prospects for 
receiving an invitation to join the Alliance, President Bush coyly asserted only that 
Albania’s best chances resided in its continued efforts toward reform.149 When meeting 
shortly thereafter with Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha in Tirana, however, the 
president conveyed his full support for Albania’s accession, and thanked the Albanian 
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Prime Minister for putting Albanian troops in harm’s way in support of U.S.-led and 
NATO-led operations.150 President Bush expanded the scope of his support for 
enlargement when he spoke in Bucharest at the start of the NATO Summit in April 2008. 
He openly advocated membership invitations for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia and 
MAP participation for Georgia and Ukraine, while considering intensified dialogues with 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, and closer cooperation with Serbia.151 He even 
visited Ukraine, where he spoke out in support of its NATO aspirations, in the days 
leading up to the Bucharest Summit. In his letter requesting the advice and consent of the 
United States Senate for the ratification of the protocols concerning the accessions of 
Albania and Croatia to the North Atlantic Treaty, President Bush touted NATO 
enlargement as “an historic success in advancing freedom, stability and democracy in the 
Euro-Atlantic area” and stated that Albania and Croatia “demonstrate to other countries 
in the Balkans and beyond that NATO’s door remains open to nations willing to shoulder 
the responsibilities of membership.”152 
In contrast to President Clinton, who confronted opposition to NATO 
enlargement within his administration, President Bush’s own viewpoint was supported by 
those of his cabinet and advisors. For example, President Bush’s Secretary of Defense 
Donald H. Rumsfeld expressed his backing in a news conference with his counterparts 
from Southeastern Europe, applauding the success of the PfP and praising the 
contributions made by new members and future candidates in Iraq and Afghanistan.153 In 
regard to the accession of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, Daniel Fata, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, remarked, “A common 
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theme from us … has been the appreciation for all that the three countries are doing in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.”154 Additionally, Condoleezza Rice, both as National Security 
Advisor and as Secretary of State, stressed the importance of keeping NATO’s door open 
and denying any non-member state a veto in NATO decisions.155 Stephen Hadley, 
Secretary Rice’s successor as National Security Advisor, was also a long-time proponent 
of NATO’s enlargement, as was Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs 
Daniel Fried, along with many others in the State Department.156 The majority of 
Washington’s political elite, by this point, had come to support the enlargement of NATO 
in principle, occasionally expressing their reservations about specific candidates, rather 
than questioning the general merits of enlargement. A noteworthy exception was the 
Secretary of Defense at that time, Robert Gates. In his memoirs, published in 2014, Gates 
wrote that 
Trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching. 
The roots of the Russian Empire trace back to Kiev in the ninth century, so 
that was an especially monumental provocation. Were the Europeans, 
much less the Americans, willing to send their sons and daughters to 
defend Ukraine or Georgia? Hardly. So NATO expansion was a political 
act, not a carefully considered military commitment, thus undermining the 
purpose of the alliance and recklessly ignoring what the Russians 
considered their own vital national interests.157 
When Russia was weak in the 1990s and beyond, we did not take Russian 
interests seriously. We did a poor job of seeing the world from their point 
of view, and of managing the relationship for the long term. All that said, I 
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was now President Bush’s secretary of defense, and I dutifully supported 
the effort to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO (with few pangs of 
conscience because by 2007 it was clear the French and Germans would 
not allow it).158 
A report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) aids in 
identifying President Bush’s specific motivation for supporting NATO’s enlargement in 
2008. A congressional resolution passed in 1999 mandates that the president inform 
Congress about political, economic, defense and other related issues regarding countries 
seeking admission to NATO prior to making any accession decisions. The Bush 
Administration submitted such reports to Congress, and the GAO produced an 
assessment of the president’s reports in September 2008. The assessment lauded the 
reports as improvements over submissions preceding earlier rounds of enlargement; 
however, the report highlighted some shortcomings in the president’s analysis. In 
particular, the GAO concluded that the information provided did not give an adequate 
assessment of the ability of the aspirants to meet the financial obligations of membership, 
nor did it reveal adequate resolution of some of the issues that might affect accession, 
such as Albania’s corruption problems. The information submitted for Congressional 
review highlighted Albania’s and Croatia’s participation in U.S.-led and NATO-led 
operations as evidence of their ability to further Allied principles and contribute to 
American national security, while only speculating on their ability to continue to support 
such efforts.159 The GAO assessment suggests that the president’s consideration of 
potential new Allies focused mainly on their contributions to ongoing military campaigns 
and less on meeting the established guidelines for membership, including their ability to 
enhance the Alliance’s collective defense posture. 
F. CONGRESSIONAL DECISION 
Throughout the fifteen years since NATO enlargement first became an important 
issue in American foreign policy in 1993, the United States Congress has passed 
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numerous pieces of legislation in support of enlarging the Alliance. These measures came 
in various forms, including declarations of support for specific candidates, authorizations 
of funds to facilitate reforms in prospective members, and ratification protocols for the 
accession of new Allies. Congressional support for enlargement remained exceptionally 
strong leading up to the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. Both Houses of Congress 
passed the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007 with unanimous consent. The 
bill’s official title, “A Bill to Endorse Further Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and to Facilitate the Timely Admission of New Members to 
NATO, and for Other Purposes,” and its content, authorizing funds for security assistance 
to Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine under the auspices of the NATO 
Participation Act of 1994, reflected comprehensive congressional support for extending 
invitations and expanding cooperative efforts with the hopeful states at the approaching 
meeting of NATO leadership in Bucharest.160 Additionally, both houses of Congress 
reaffirmed their support for NATO enlargement and passed independent resolutions 
calling upon the Allies to extend a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to both Ukraine and 
Georgia in February 2008. It should be noted that a motion to reconsider was nonetheless 
tabled for the House resolution.161 
The debate in the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee leading up to 
Senate’s the ratification of the accessions of Albania and Croatia encompassed a wide 
range of issues, including economic, political, and military reform as well as broad 
security implications, and was largely supportive of NATO membership for both Albania 
and Croatia. Senator Richard Lugar referenced Albania’s and Croatia’s contributions to 
NATO missions in Afghanistan and their geostrategic location to support operations in 
the Balkans as compelling arguments in support of their accession to the Alliance, and his 
sentiments were echoed by several others. 
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For example, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Dan 
Fried described NATO enlargement in general as a way to promote reform and 
reconciliation in Central and Eastern Europe, focusing on the political merits rather than 
military enhancements, before commending the progress made by Albania, Croatia, and 
Macedonia. Additionally, Assistant Secretary Fried referenced threats to European 
security posed by Russia’s invasion of Georgia and nationalism in the Balkans, which 
could be partially alleviated by incorporating new members into the Alliance.  
Several concerns were thoroughly addressed during testimony: the commitment 
of each candidate to democratic reform and Western values, the increased potential for 
conflict by taking on new members given existing turmoil and perceived spheres of 
influence, and, oddly, the lack of participation in the hearing by key players. Connecticut 
Senator Christopher J. Dodd, acting as chairman of the committee, remarked several 
times about the small turnout of committee members and the absence of military and 
Defense Department representation. Notably absent, Dodd remarked, were the EUCOM 
Commander, GEN Bantz J. Craddock; the Committee Chairman, Delaware Senator 
Joseph R. Biden; and junior Illinois Senator Barack Obama, having recently received the 
Democratic nomination for the White House.162 The low level of senatorial participation 
suggests that NATO enlargement was not seen as an issue of paramount importance or 
controversy. 
With regard to other concerns, the expert testimony given before the committee 
largely downplayed the significance of any apprehensions, lauded the aspirants’ progress, 
and specifically referenced their military contributions to ongoing operations. Ultimately, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification of the protocols of 
accession for both Albania and Croatia.163 On September 25, 2008, the Senate voted to 
ratify the protocols for accession to the North Atlantic Treaty for Albania and Croatia 
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subject to presidential certification that in neither case would the accession result in an 
increase in overall U.S. expenditure as a percentage share of NATO’s common budget 
nor would the United States’ ability to meet its global military requirements be 
hampered.164 
G. CONCLUSION 
The American position supporting further NATO enlargement at the Bucharest 
Summit in 2008 reflected the continuation of an accepted foreign policy initiative and a 
desire to increase Allied support of U.S.-led and NATO-led military operations abroad. 
Presidential statements and documentation revealed that, while the logic of creating a 
Europe whole and free by enlarging NATO remained valid, aspirants’ contributions to 
U.S.-led operations in Iraq and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo were of 
paramount importance. Shortcomings in reform efforts, questions about the candidates’ 
ability to fulfill their collective defense obligations, and the impacts of enlargement on 
relations with Russia were issues of secondary importance. The Congressional debate 
reflected the same pattern. These issues were addressed, but ultimately subordinated to 
the desire to expand America’s pool of Allies and reward these states for their 
contributions. The third round of post-Cold War NATO enlargement was significantly 
different from the previous rounds in that no formal efforts to placate Russia preceded the 
enlargement decision. Russia’s objections regarding Georgia and Ukraine influenced the 
policies of some Allies, but had little demonstrated effect on America’s support for 
establishing closer ties with these countries and setting them on a clearer path to 
membership. The admission of Albania and Croatia, small countries with limited military 
capabilities located in a region rife with conflict, suggests that NATO’s role as a political 
cooperation and stabilization association came to rival its position as a collective defense 
organization. 
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Time and again, persistent threats to transatlantic security have revealed the need 
to sustain the Atlantic Alliance, despite the changing nature of the threats at hand. Cold 
War fears of communist aggression were replaced by the dangers of instability created by 
ethnic and religious conflicts, as demonstrated in the Balkans. These dangers in turn gave 
way to menacing transnational terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. As the threats 
changed, so too did the appropriate means for addressing them. With regard to certain 
threats, the importance of enhanced political association trumped that of increased 
military capability. Enlarging the international community of free democracies by 
expanding NATO membership provided a way to counter some types of emerging 
threats, such as tensions between neighbors. 
A. NATO’S POST-COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT 
In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were admitted to the Alliance, 
due, in no small part, to American support. This support was born of the belief that the 
ethnic and nationalistic dangers that had wrought havoc upon the European continent, 
and ultimately the world, during the first half of the twentieth century survived in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The United States and its NATO Allies sought to contain these 
forces by extending NATO’s umbrella of protection to cover the newly formed 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, alleviating their fears of external aggression 
and rewarding their progress toward Western democratic reform. The accessions of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland would serve as a model for other European 
countries and promote the spread of democracy to ensure peace and stability on the 
continent. In this context, the Russian Federation set itself on a path to become a strategic 
partner of the United States, NATO, and the European Union, a goal desired by all of the 
countries involved. Russian concerns carried great weight as Western leaders sought to 
cultivate the relationship and support Russian reformers. Russia would not receive a vote 
in the North Atlantic Council, however, and the enlargement of NATO proceeded on its 
own merits despite Russian objections. The United States and the Allies sought to soften 
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the blow and serve the greater goal of peace and stability by signing the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act and establishing the Permanent Joint Council for closer consultation and 
cooperation with their Russian counterparts. The desire among American decision-
makers to consolidate the democratic gains made in Central and Eastern Europe carried 
the day. 
In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
joined NATO in the so-called Big Bang round of enlargement. The momentum for these 
additions was created at the Washington Summit in 1999 when NATO heads of state and 
government agreed to have their foreign ministers continually assess the enlargement 
issue through the newly created Membership Action Plan (MAP) and to formally address 
the issue again at the next NATO Summit.165 Thus, this second round of post-Cold War 
NATO enlargement was largely a question not of whether NATO should accept 
additional members or when new invitations would be extended, but rather who would be 
invited. The terrorist attacks against the United States by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 
greatly affected this debate. The United States, in response, launched a global war on 
terrorism, and partners in this effort were of great importance. A country’s ability to 
provide access and information became just as important as its ability to contribute forces 
and equipment. The NATO hopefuls gained great favor with the United States by 
providing whatever they could muster in support of U.S.-led and NATO-led operations. 
Russia, too, seized the opportunity to seek rapprochement with the NATO Allies and add 
legitimacy to its own domestic counterterror efforts; the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
was created as a result in 2002. The United States thus supported a large-scale increase in 
the Alliance’s membership to expand NATO’s base of support. The contentious 
incorporation of the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was 
accepted by Moscow in the context of NATO’s greater formalized cooperation with 
Russia. The principal consideration at this juncture was increasing the Alliance’s ability 
to address the emerging terrorist threat, and the aspirant candidates proved their worth by 
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expressing solidarity with the United States and the other NATO Allies and providing 
what assistance they could. 
The year 2009 saw the accessions of Albania and Croatia. Some observers argued 
that the two Balkan states were admitted to the Alliance more on the basis of their 
contributions to ongoing U.S.-led operations in Iraq and NATO-led operations in 
Afghanistan and Kosovo than on their progress toward fulfilling Western democratic 
reforms, though both made significant strides toward achieving such reforms. Rewarding 
Albania and Croatia with NATO membership for their support and involvement despite 
their small size, limited resources, and proximity to conflict zones illustrates that political 
considerations were elevated above military capabilities as factors influencing decision-
makers in the United States and the Alliance as a whole. The United States and the  
other NATO Allies have supported NATO membership for Macedonia since 2008, as 
soon as its name dispute with Greece has been resolved on a mutually acceptable basis. 
By supporting the candidacies of these nations, the United States gained additional 
supporters for its increasingly controversial military operations abroad and attempted to 
further consolidate democratic reforms by extending the Alliance security umbrella into 
the Western Balkans. 
With regard to Georgia and Ukraine, strong Russian objections undermined 
support for their NATO aspirations in some Allied governments, but not in the United 
States. As with other NATO aspirants, the support that Georgia and Ukraine provided for 
U.S.-led and NATO-led military operations garnered them great favor with U.S. leaders, 
despite their ongoing disputes with the Russian Federation, which alienated some 
European Allies. Whether all officials in the administration of George W. Bush genuinely 
supported the extension of MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine or whether some privately 
relied upon the negative votes of Allies like France and Germany to prevent closer 
association and Russian provocation is open for debate. The recent memoir of former 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggests that he had reservations about this part of the 
Bucharest Summit Declaration. It is clear, however, that Congress strongly supported the 
candidacies of both Georgia and Ukraine, as evidenced by the multiple resolutions to that 
effect passed in both houses, as discussed in Chapters III and IV. It is also apparent that 
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U.S. leaders continuously sought to limit Russian influence on NATO decision-making 
and to preserve the policy that NATO’s door remains open to any European state willing 
and able “to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the 
North Atlantic area,” as indicated in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
B. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ENLARGEMENT 
In 2015, the consolidation of European democracy through NATO is not yet 
complete; four states are actively seeking closer association and full-fledged membership 
in the Alliance. These states are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro.166 Under President Viktor Yanukovich Ukraine backed away from its active 
pursuit of NATO membership over the past decade.167  Since December 2014, however, 
under President Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s official policy has been to seek NATO 
membership.168 As noted previously, the Allies have been in agreement since 2008 that 
Macedonia will be invited to accede to NATO as soon as it reaches an agreed solution to 
its name dispute with NATO member Greece,169 but little progress has been made toward 
that end. Montenegro reached out to NATO shortly after gaining its independence in 
2006 by joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and was quickly invited to participate in 
the MAP in 2009. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the Allies agreed to assess the 
country’s membership application “with a view to deciding on whether to invite 
Montenegro to join the Alliance” by the end of 2015.170 Bosnia and Herzegovina also 
joined the PfP in 2006 and was invited to participate in the MAP in 2009; this shows 
remarkable progress considering the fact that this country was the site of a NATO-led 
military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs in the early 1990s.  Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina’s NATO candidacy is complicated by its failure to resolve an issue 
regarding the registration of all military installations and immovable equipment in its 
territories as central government property. The issue persists due to the reluctance of the 
government of the Republika Srpska, one of the country’s two semiautonomous regions, 
to conform to NATO’s guidelines.171 Georgia’s application has been hampered by its 
2008 war with Russia and the subsequent territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Russia has recognized the separatist regions as independent states and has 
established a military presence in each region.172 
The prospects for continued American support for NATO enlargement are good, 
especially for the Balkan aspirants. By incorporating all of the Balkan aspirants, NATO 
would encapsulate Serbia, with which most of the Allies have an ongoing dispute 
regarding the independence of Kosovo. Each of these states must continue to make 
progress on its designated reform path. Movement toward membership for Montenegro 
might motivate Macedonia to work toward settling its name dispute with Greece. 
Likewise, Bosnia and Herzegovina might be persuaded to resolve the issue regarding the 
registration of its immovable defense property and commit to greater reform progress. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro are relatively far removed from 
what might be considered the Russian Federation’s current sphere of influence. In any 
event, such claims by Russia did not deter U.S. support for NATO hopefuls in the past, 
such as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Baltic states also had 
unresolved border disputes with Russia that did not prevent their accession, although it 
must be noted that these disputes were relatively minor compared to those involving 
Georgia. 
One might assume that Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine will halt 
NATO enlargement for the near term, especially in Georgia’s case; however, there is 
evidence suggesting that Russia’s actions might provoke the exact opposite reaction, at 
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least in the United States. Many officials in the executive branch and many Members of 
Congress have voiced their continued support for Georgia’s closer cooperation with the 
Alliance. In April 2014, in response to the Ukraine crisis, a resolution was put forth in the 
House of Representatives calling for the immediate extension of invitations for 
Montenegro to join the Alliance and for Georgia to join the MAP.173 Additionally, forty 
Members of Congress signed a letter urging Secretary of State John Kerry to “make 
enlargement a key priority of the United States and the Alliance” at the 2014 NATO 
Summit in Wales; the letter also advocated implementing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
MAP and extending an invitation to Georgia to participate in the MAP.174 In response, 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield wrote, “We believe 
Georgia deserves credit at the upcoming NATO Summit for the progress it has made and 
its demonstrated commitment to NATO operations and standards. We stand ready to 
support Georgia's own efforts to build a consensus within the Alliance for granting it a 
Membership Action Plan.”175 As long as Russia continues its departure from cultivating a 
partnership with the United States and NATO, Russian objections will not deter U.S. 
support for NATO enlargement and may even bolster it. 
President Obama’s support for Georgia’s candidacy and NATO enlargement in 
general appears to have wavered. In January 2012, following a meeting with Georgian 
President Saakashvili, President Obama declared, “the United States will continue to 
support Georgia’s aspirations to ultimately become a member of NATO.”176 More 
recently, at a March 2014 press conference in Brussels, President Obama backtracked on 
his previous commitment to support Georgia’s membership in NATO: “I think that 
neither Ukraine or [sic] Georgia are currently on a path to NATO membership, and there 
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has not been any immediate plans for expansion of NATO's membership.”177 Explicit 
support from the president for continued enlargement had been a continuous element of 
America’s Alliance policy. President Obama’s comments do not bode well for NATO 
applicants and may be particularly damaging to Georgia’s prospects for MAP 
participation, at least under the current U.S. presidential administration. 
Though the circumstances driving America’s support for NATO enlargement 
have changed over time, the desire to create a Europe whole and free continues to be its 
underlying justification. NATO and European Union military missions persist in the 
Balkans, but the greater threat to European security there has largely been managed. The 
United States has withdrawn most of its troops from military operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and its continued presence in the Middle East, fighting Islamic State militants, 
has not been as controversial as its earlier intervention in Iraq. Nonetheless, the need for 
cooperative efforts to combat emerging threats endures. The threat of violent extremists 
participating in ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia and then 
traveling to Western countries to spread the violence has emerged, and transnational 
terrorist organizations continue to pose a danger to the United States and its NATO 
Allies. The logic of enhancing Western security through increased political and military 
association within NATO remains sound. The United States will probably continue to 
support NATO membership for additional European democracies, particularly those in 
the Balkans with large Muslim populations, in order to promote stability and other shared 
Alliance purposes through integration. NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement has 
enhanced the Alliance’s ability to address evolving threats to trans-Atlantic security, and 
the negative effects of enlargement that many predicted have not yet materialized. In light 
of this record, U.S. support for the NATO aspirations of Europe’s remaining democratic 
applicants will probably persist. 
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